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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
Cross-Appellant, 
v. 
KATHLEEN GILES, Case No. 970289-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant 
Cross-Appellee. 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Appellee Kathleen Giles 
("Applicant" or "Giles") relies on her opening brief ("A.B.") and 
also refers this Court to that brief for the statements of 
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, the facts, and the summary of 
the argument. Appellant responds to the State's answer to her 
opening brief and cross-appeal as follows. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE ON CROSS-APPEAL 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue--Cross-appeal (Point III): Whether the trial judge 
properly dismissed Count I based on his conclusion that a valid 
marriage did not exist. 
Standard of Review: This issue involves a question of 
law which is reviewed for correctness. See State in the Interest 
of M.C., 940 P.2d 1229, 1233 (Utah App. 1997)(questions of 
statutory construction are reviewed for correctness). 
TEXT OF STATUTES RELEVANT TO CROSS-APPEAL 
The text of the following statutes is contained in 
Addendum A to this brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-2-24 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-1-1 and 30-1-2 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-1-4.5 and 30-1-5 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-1-6 and 30-1-7 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-1-8 and 30-1-11 (1995); 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-12 (1995). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I--Shondel--Count II. The elements contained in 
the Information and Instruction for Count II establish that the 
elements found by the jury in convicting Giles of the felony were 
identical to the elements required for the misdemeanor 
conviction. The State's attempt to distinguish the misdemeanor 
and felony by arguing that Giles was an "applicant" rather than a 
"recipient" fails. The evidence and prosecutor's argument 
demonstrate that the State used the terms "recipient" and 
"applicant" interchangeably and based its case on a general claim 
that Giles failed to disclose a material fact either when she 
filled out the application or later, when she filled out the 
review form. The evidence also shows that Giles received 
benefits in the months immediately prior to August 1993 when she 
filled out the application for assistance, that she had a 
caseworker prior to filling out that application and that she was 
a "recipient" when she filled out the application. 
Point II--Insufficient Evidence--Count II. The State 
offered evidence that Giles received a $1,424 overpayment 
assuming that Paul Felicetti ("Felicetti") lived in the household 
and shared meals with the other household members. It presented 
no other evidence as to the amount of overpayment. Because the 
State did not establish that Felicetti ate his meals with the 
2 
household, the $1,424 calculation for overpayment does not 
support a conviction. 
Point III--Cross-appeal--Count I. The trial judge 
correctly concluded pursuant to Utah's marriage statutes, that a 
valid marriage did not exist. Pursuant to rules of statutory 
construction, the requirement that the officiate return the 
license and certificate containing specified information is 
mandatory. Assuming, arguendo, that this Court were to reverse 
the dismissal, the Shondel argument set forth in Point I is also 
applicable to Count I. Additionally, both Counts I and II 
involve the same facts and circumstances or a related series of 
facts and circumstances and therefore should be consolidated into 
a single count. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE SHONDEL DOCTRINE APPLIES SINCE THE 
ELEMENTS OF THE MISDEMEANOR AND FELONY ARE WHOLLY 
DUPLICATIVE. 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
The State claims that the Shondel1 doctrine does not 
apply in this case because Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203(3) applies 
only to situations where a person is already receiving benefits 
and fails to report a change in material fact whereas this case 
involves a failure to disclose a material fact at the time of 
application. S.B. at 13.2 Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203(3) (1995) 
1
 State v. Shondel, 453 P.2d 146 (Utah 1969). 
2
 The State also claims that the Shondel doctrine does not 
apply to misdemeanor crimes outlined in Section 76-8-1203(2) (1995) 
because that section does not require overpayment whereas the 
3 
stated: 
(3) Any recipient who intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly fails to disclose to the 
Department of Human Services any change in a 
material fact required to be disclosed under 
Subsection (1), within ten days after the date of 
the change, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if 
that failure to disclose results in an 
overpayment. 
A review of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-1205(11) and 76-8-1206 
demonstrates that the felony for which Giles was convicted 
contains identical elements as the misdemeanor in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-1203(3) (1995). Section 76-8-1205(11) states: 
Each of the following persons, who 
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly commits 
any of the following acts, is guilty of public 
assistance fraud: 
• • • 
(11) any person who obtains an 
overpayment by violation of Section 76-8-
1203 or 76-8-1204. 
This statute in conjunction with Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1206 makes 
it a felony to violate Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203(3) (1995) and 
receive an overpayment in excess of $1,000. Hence, any violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203(3) is subject to both a misdemeanor 
and felony conviction. The Shondel doctrine requires that such 
crimes be classified as misdemeanors. See A.B. at 21-25. 
The State claims that Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203(3) does 
not apply to this case because Giles was an "applicant" rather 
than "recipient" and Section 76-8-1203(3) applies only to 
felony requires overpayment of a specific amount. S.B. at 11-12, 
15. Giles did not argue, however, that the elements of Subsection 
(2) were "wholly duplicative" of the felony. Instead, her argument 
focuses on Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1203(3) (1995). 
4 
recipients. A review of the record defeats the State's claim. 
The Information made no allegation as to whether Giles 
was a recipient or applicant and alleged that Giles "failed to 
disclose any material fact or change in circumstances for the 
purposes of obtaining or continuing to receive public 
assistance." R. 02; see Information in Addendum D to A.B. 
Hence, the Information treated "applicants" and "recipients" 
interchangeably and alleged that the felony occurred based on 
failure to disclose a material fact or failure to disclose a 
change in circumstances. 
Instruction #6, the elements instruction for Count II, 
likewise did not require the jury to determine whether Giles was 
a "recipient" who failed to disclose a change or an "applicant" 
who failed to disclose a material fact. Instead, it required the 
jury to determine whether Giles failed to disclose "each fact 
which may materially affect the determination of her eligibility 
to receive public assistance." R. 99; see Instruction #6 in 
Addendum E to A.B. Hence, the jury was required to find only 
whether there was a failure to disclose a material fact, and not 
whether that nondisclosure occurred at the time of the initial 
application or later, when a change in circumstances occurred. 
A Shondel analysis focuses on the elements of two 
statutes and not the factual application of the statutes. Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-1205(11) outlines identical elements as Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-1203(3). Instruction #6 allowed the jury to 
convict Giles if it found the elements of Utah Code Ann. 
5 
§ 76-8-1203(3) and no additional elements. Giles is therefore 
entitled to the lesser class B misdemeanor. 
Moreover, the record does not support the State's claim 
that Giles was convicted of being an "applicant" who failed to 
disclose a material fact rather than a "recipient" who failed to 
disclose a material change. Although Giles filled out an 
"Application For Financial or Medical Assistance or Food Stamps" 
on August 30, 1993 (see State's Exhibit ("S.E.") 6), she was a 
recipient who received assistance in July 1993 and the preceding 
months. See S.E. 6 at 2, S.E. 17 and S.E. 18. See S.E. 17 and 
S.E. 18 in Addendum B to this brief. Kathy Cordova ("Cordova") 
testified that an application for assistance is not necessarily 
made at the beginning of when someone receives assistance. 
R. 154:107. Such applications are also filled out at closure. 
R. 154:107. Additionally, Cordova's testimony indicated that a 
caseworker had been on Giles' case prior to Cordova's assumption 
of that case. Cordova "assume[d] or start[ed] the case file on 
Ms. Giles" at the end of August or early September, 1993. 
R. 154:02. She could not recall whether she was Giles' 
caseworker prior to September 1993. R. 154:107. Nor did she 
know who had contacts with Giles or who was her caseworker prior 
to August 1993. R. 154:123. This testimony read in conjunction 
with S.E. 17 and S.E. 18 demonstrate that Giles was an ongoing 
"recipient" of benefits even though she filed out an 
"application" in August 1993. 
In addition, the State's case was based on a claim that 
6 
Giles was a "recipient" who failed to report a change. Cordova 
testified that Giles was a "recipient," and later used the terms 
"recipient" and "applicant" interchangeably. R. 154:102, 13 6. 
The State introduced S.E. 7, a review form completed by Giles on 
January 25, 1994 in support of its case. R. 154:116. Cordova 
also testified that at the time Giles filled out S.E. 7, Giles 
did not mention Felicetti. R. 154:188. In closing, the 
prosecutor used the term "recipient" to refer generally to one 
who applies for benefits. R. 154:132. He relied on S.E. 6 as 
well as the review form, S.E. 7, in support of his argument. 
R. 154:134. Hence, the evidence and argument demonstrate that 
Count II was based on a claim that Giles was a recipient who 
failed to report a material fact. 
In this case, the elements established by the State in 
seeking a felony conviction were identical to the misdemeanor 
elements required to prove a crime under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
1203(3). The trial court therefore erred in failing to enter 
conviction for the lesser class B misdemeanor. 
POINT II. THE STATE PRESENTED INSUFFICIENT 
EVIDENCE AS TO COUNT II. 
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief) 
Count II required the State to establish that Giles 
failed to disclose household composition and income, which 
resulted in overpayment in excess of $1,000. R. 02, R. 99, 
R. 155:82. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the verdict, the State failed to establish that any failure to 
report that Felicetti was living in the house and providing 
7 
income resulted in overpayments which were greater than $1,000. 
The State agrees that this count is based on food stamp 
fraud. S.B. at 16 n.6. Although Giles recognizes that there was 
sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Felicetti lived 
with Giles, she claims that the State failed to establish 
sufficient evidence to establish that his presence resulted in 
her receiving excess food stamp benefits of greater than 
$1,000.3 
The evidence presented by the State established that a 
food stamp benefit is reduced where an additional person moves 
into the household, contributes income and eats meals there. 
R. 154:125; S.E. 6. As set forth in A.B. at 29, Cordova 
testified that food stamp eligibility is affected only if an 
additional person eats his meals in the home. R. 154:12 9. 
Likewise, the public assistance forms suggest that additional 
persons must share food in order to affect food stamp 
eligibility. See S.B. at 17. 
Neither Cordova nor Campbell provided testimony 
demonstrating that Giles received food stamp overpayment in 
excess of $1,000 based on a failure to disclose that Felicetti 
lived in the house. See A.B. at 29. Yei testified that 
according to his calculations, Giles received $1,424 overpayment 
for food stamps. R. 155:55. Yei's calculations were based on 
3
 Contrary to the State's suggestion, Giles is not seeking a 
specialized definition of household composition. See S.B. at 17 
n.7. Instead, Giles is requiring the State to follow the statute 
and establish that Giles obtained an overpayment in excess of 
$1,000 by failing to disclose that Felicetti lived with her. 
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his assumption that Felicetti lived in the household and ate his 
meals there. R. 155:55. Since the State failed to establish 
that Felicetti ate his meals with the household, Yei's figures 
are meaningless. The State therefore failed to prove that the 
nondisclosure resulted in an overpayment in excess of $1,000. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED 
MS. GILES' MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT WHERE GILES 
AND PAUL FELICETTI WERE NOT LEGALLY MARRIED. 
(Response to Points III and IV of Cross-Appellee's Brief)4 
In Count I of the Information, the State charged Giles 
with fraudulently obtaining or continuing to receive public 
assistance in excess of $5,000 based oi i a failure to disclose 
marital status. R. 01-02, 98; see addenda D and E to A.B. At 
the close of the State's case, Giles moved for a directed verdict 
on Count I based oi I t l le State's failure to prove that she and 
Felicetti were validly married. R. 155:82-87. The judge 
indicated that he would probably take the issue under advisement 
and let the matter yu * h^ ;^ serious 
reservations as to whether a legal marriage existed. 
R. 155:87.5 
The parties again ar gued the issue after all of the 
evidence was presented. R. 155:110-26. Ultimately, defense 
4
 The facts relevant to this issue are set forth in A.B. at 
9-19 and in the argument in this point. 
5
 The judge was required to rule on the motion at the close 
of the State's case. See State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 
1992). Although consideration of defendant's evidence does not 
affect the determination whether a valid marriage was established, 
this Court should only consider evidence introduced in the State's 
case in chief in deciding this issue. 
9 
counsel indicated that the matter should go to the jury so that 
the state could not appeal, but reserved his right to renew his 
argument should the jury convict Giles of Count I. R. 155:127. 
The judge agreed to this approach. R. 155:127. 
Prior to sentencing, Giles moved to arrest judgment on 
Count I. R. 115-18, 156:3. The trial judge found that the 
marriage license had not been returned and granted the motion 
based on the failure to return the license as required by 
statute. R. 156:13, 18. 
A Mormon bishop testified that in mid-summer 1993, he 
performed a marriage ceremony for Giles. R. 154: 89-90. He also 
testified that he "made sure that all of the witnesses had signed 
the document and that it was appropriately filled out, ... 
including [his] signature." R. 154:93. He then "asked them if 
they would please mail it in." R. 154:93. 
Giles introduced as Defendant's Exhibit ("D.E.") 5 a 
partially completed application for license to marry; see D.E. 5 
in Addendum C to this brief. The portions of that form which are 
to be filled out by the person officiating are blank. These 
include the date of the marriage, the county and state, and the 
name and title of the person officiating. The date on which the 
form was received by local officials is also blank. The State 
did not introduce a copy of a license. 
A. THE TRIAL JUDGE PROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT A 
VALID MARRIAGE DID NOT EXIST. 
The trial judge correctly concluded that a valid, 
completed marriage did not exist in this case where the license 
10 
was not returned. Utah statutory law requires compliance with 
the following formalities to constitute a completed marriage. 
No marriage may be solemnized without a license 
issued by the county clerk of any county of the 
state of Utah not more than 3 0 days prior to the 
date of the solemnization of the marriage. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-7 (1995) Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-11 (1995) 
requires that the officiate return the license to the county 
clerk within 3 0 days after the marriage, and imposes criminal 
penalties for failure to do so. It states: 
The person solemnizing the marriage shall within 
3 0 days thereafter return the license to the 
clerk of the county whence it was issued, with a 
certificate of the marriage over his signature, 
giving the date and place of celebration and the 
names of two or more witnesses present at the 
marriage. For failure to make such return he 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
Utah Code Ann. § 3 0-1-11 (19 95). When these statutes are iead 
together, the mandate that the officiate return the certificate 
and license is encompassed in and required as part of the act of 
solemnization. 
The provisions of the code relevant to marriages also 
mandate that after the officiate returns the license and 
certificate to the county clerk, the county clerk must file the 
certificate of the officiate along with the license and promptly 
certify a copy of both to the state registrar of vital 
statistics. Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-12 (1995); see also Utah Code 
Ann. § 26-2-24 (1995). 
Ut:ah Code Ann. § 26-2-24 (1995), found in the Vital 
Statistics Act, requires the county clerk to return a completed 
11 
application to the registrar of vital statistics. It states: 
The state registrar shall supply county 
clerks with application forms for marriage 
licenses. Completed applications shall be 
transmitted by the clerks to the state registrar 
monthly. The personal identification information 
contained on each application for a marriage 
license filed with the county clerk shall be 
entered on a form supplied by the state 
registrar. The person performing the marriage 
shall furnish the date and place of marriage and 
his name and address. The form shall be 
completed and certified by the county clerk 
before it is returned to the state registrar. 
Utah Code Ann. § 26-2-24 (1995) (emphasis added). Sections 30-1-
12 and 26-2-24 contemplate that the marriage information will be 
transmitted to the registrar of vital statistics only after the 
officiate has completed his mandatory task of filling out the 
form and returning it to the county clerk. These statutes 
harmonize with an interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-11 
which mandates that the officiate return the license and a 
certificate containing the required information before a valid 
marriage occurs since without such a return, the marriage would 
not be recorded with the department of vital statistics. 
Although there is no Utah case law directly on point as 
to whether failure to comply with statutory requirements renders 
a marriage invalid, traditional rules of statutory construction 
support the trial judge's conclusion that a valid marriage did 
not exist. A statutory requirement which is mandatory requires 
precise compliance "or the transaction or process is 
invalidated." Moore v. Schwendiman, 750 P.2d 204, 206 (Utah App. 
1988) (citation omitted). Where a statutory requirement is only 
12 
directory, substantial compliance is sufficient. Id. "The most 
fundamental g iiideline :i n di stinguishing mandatory from directory 
provisions is to give effect to the legislative intent." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
Consideration must be given to the entire 
statute, its nature, its object, and the 
consequences which would result from construing 
it one way or the other.... [It depends] on 
whether the thing directed to be done is of the 
essence of the thing required, or is a mere 
matter of form.... [W]here the directions of a 
statute are given merely with a view to the 
proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of business, 
it is generally regarded as directory.... [A] 
statute is regarded as directory where no 
substantial rights depend on it, no injury can 
result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the 
legislature can be accomplished in a manner other 
than that prescribed, with substantially the same 
results. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
When construing a statute, " [i]t is presumed that 'words 
are used in their ordinary sense.'" State in the Interest of 
M.C., 940 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah App. 1997) (citation omitted). 
"It is also well established that ' [t]he form of the verb used in 
the statute, i.e., something xmay, ' 'shall' or '" mxist' be dune, is 
the single most important textual consideration determining 
whether a statute is mandatory or directory.'" Id. (quoting 3 
Norman dinger, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 5 7.03, at 7 
(5th ed. 1992)), The term "may" ordinarily "means permissive, 
and it should receive that interpretation unless such a 
construction would be obv iously repugnant to the intention of the 
Legislature or would lead to some other inconvenience or 
absurdity." Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah App. 
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1992) (citation omitted). "The term xshall,' on the other hand, 
xis usually presumed mandatory and has been interpreted as such 
previously in this and other jurisdictions. '" State in the 
Interest of M.C., 940 P.2d at 1236 (citations omitted). Where 
confusion arises due to the use of both "may" and "shall" in 
interlocking statutes, such confusion can be mitigated by 
harmonizing the two sections. State in the Interest of M.C., 940 
P.2d at 1236. 
While a permissive "may" is used in Section 30-1-7, 
Section 3 0-1-11 contains a mandatory "shall" in relation to the 
requirement that the officiate return the license to the county 
clerk within 30 days. The term "shall" in Section 30-1-11 also 
applies to the requirement that the officiate include a 
certificate which gives the location and date of the ceremony as 
well as the names of at least two witnesses. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 30-1-11. As a starting place, the word "shall" requires * 
mandatory compliance unless a review of the remaining statutes 
demonstrates that such an interpretation does not harmonize with 
the statutory scheme. 
A review of the remaining statutes demonstrates, however, 
that the Legislature intended that return of the license and 
certificate be mandatory. First, Section 30-1-11 makes it a 
misdemeanor for the officiate to fail to make the required 
return. 
Second, unless Section 30-1-11 is considered mandatory, 
there is no other statute which would make the ceremony 
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mandatory. In other words, solemnization would not be required 
after applying If i i license, unless Section 3 0-1-11 is 
mandatory; this would be contrary to the law in Utah and 
legislative intent. See Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67-68 
(Utah App. 1991); Ulah Code ami, k§ 30-1-5, 30-1-4 5, 30-1-6 
(1995) . 
Third, Section 30-1-12 requires the county clerk to file, 
preserve and record the returned license along with the 
certificate, and to transmit a certified transcript of the 
returned documents to the state registrar of vital statistics. 
The word "shall" is also used in both requirements out Lined in 
Section 30-1-12, and signifies that these requirements are 
mandatory. There is no requirement for transmitting information 
regarding an incomplete application for a inarriage license Lo the 
registrar of vital statistics. See also Utah Code Ann. § 26-2-24 
(1995) . 
Fourth, i Section 30-1 b, the legislature expressly 
validated marriages performed by unauthorized persons if the 
parties believed the person had authority and that they were 
lawfully married. This section suggests that absent this 
language, such marriages would be invalid. It also indicates 
that the legislature considered the effect of failure to comply 
with the statutes and decided to validate defective marriages in 
only this area. 
Statutes outlining requirements for marriages serve 
several purposes. While statutory requirements for marriage help 
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emphasize the importance of the commitment to the participants 
and carry out religious beliefs, they also serve a critical role 
in informing others that a legal union has been made, creating a 
permanent record of that union and collecting vital statistics. 
Under Utah's statutory scheme, these important functions of 
giving notice that a marriage has occurred, creating a permanent 
record of completed marriages and collecting vital statistics are 
not served unless the officiate completes the mandatory 
requirement of returning the license and certificate. 
This mandatory reading of the statutes comports with 
language in Schurler v. Industrial Commission, 43 P.2d 696, 697 
(Utah 1935) . In Schurler, the Utah Supreme Court stated, "In 
this state marriage must be consummated by a ceremony as provided 
by the statutes." Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, in Stoker 
v. Gowans,147 P. 911, 912 (Utah 1915), the Utah Supreme Court 
upheld the trial court's conclusion that a juvenile's marriage 
was not valid. The Court relied on provisions similar to 
Sections 30-1-7 and 30-1-11 and stated: 
Our statute also provides that the license issued 
as aforesaid must be returned to the county clerk 
within 3 0 days after the marriage ceremony takes 
place. It is somewhat strange, therefore, that 
when there must have been an abundance of 
competent evidence respecting the marriage, if it 
was solemnized, that none was produced, not even 
an eyewitness. Not even the parties in interest 
testified, although one of them was a witness at 
the hearing. If the district judge, therefore, 
had found that no marriage was proved (which he 
may have done), the finding would not only have 
been justified by the record, but, in our 
judgment, it would have been the only finding he 
legally could have made. 
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Stoker, 147 P. at 912. 
Historical] y, Utah did not recognize common law marriage 
and expressly prohibited such marriages. See Whvte v. Blair, 885 
P. 2d 791, 793 (Utah 1994). In 1987, the Legislature enacted 
Utah Code A] in § 30-1-4.5 (1995). That section establishes a 
statutory form of common law marriage which exists only if all of 
the statutory requirements are met. See Whyte, 885 P.2d at 794; 
see text ui Section 30-1-4..lJ in Addendum, A to this brief. 
Section 30-1-4.5 allows a marriage to be validated where 
"a woman and a man have by their prior consent and conduct 
entered into a marital relationship, although 
theretofore formally solemnized or otherwise legally recognized." 
Whyte, 885 P.2d at 793. It requires, however, that a court or 
administrative order finding that a marriage exists be issued a:i I I 
that such determination be made within one year of the 
termination of the relationship. See Whyte, 885 P.2d at 794. 
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 [T] he effect of a court order [is] to recognize a idwiul 
marriage that began before the order was entered and existed from 
that :rn:il terminated... . " Whyte, 885 P.2d at 794. This 
requirement that a formal document of record recognize 11le 
existence of the statutory common law marriage serves the 
recording, notice and collection purposes behind Utah's statutory 
scheme for marriage. It also suggests that the legislature 
wanted to provide a limited means of establishing a marriage for 
people who agree to be married and who are holding themselves out 
as married, but who do not meet the mandatory requirements for a 
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licensed marriage. See Whyte, 885 P.2d at 794-95. 
The State claims that since the statutes do not expressly-
state that a marriage is invalid if the officiate does not return 
the license, the marriage should be deemed valid. S.B. at 24-25. 
This disregards traditional rules of statutory construction. The 
State argues that since Sections 30-1-1 and 30-1-2 enumerate void 
or prohibited marriages, but do not mention failure to return the 
license, this Court should conclude that failure to return the 
license and certificate did not invalidate the marriage. S.B. at 
24. Sections 30-1-1 and 30-1-2 expressly address only void and 
prohibited marriages; those sections do not address the issue in 
this case of whether the failure to follow mandatory requirements 
precludes the existence of a valid marriage. See Gamez v. 
Industrial Commission, 559 P.2d 1094, 1099 (Ariz. App. 1976) 
(distinguishing between void or voidable marriages, and marriages 
which were never completed). 
The State's reliance on Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 82-
83 (1877) is also misplaced. See Moran v. Moran, 933 P.2d 1207, 
1210 (Ariz. App. 1996) (indicating party who relied on Moran 
misread the opinion) . Meistei: acknowledges that where a state 
recognizes common law marriage, a valid marriage exists even if 
the statutory requirements are not met. Meister, 96 U.S. at 
81-83. In a common law marriage state, upholding a marriage 
where some of the statutory requirements for a lawful marriage 
have not been met makes sense. Meister also recognizes, however, 
that some states7 marriage "statutes have been construed as 
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denying validity to marriages not formed according to the 
statutory directions." Meister, 96 U.S at 79. 
The only form of common law marriage recognized in Utah 
is the form identified in Section 30-1-4.5. In many but not all 
cases, i . officiate fails to return :he license and 
certificate, a valid marriage would nevertheless be found to 
exist under that provision. The timing and other requirements 
preclude universal validation of a] ] marriages where the 
statutory requirements for a licensed marriage are not met. 
Therefore, Utah's statutory scheme does not comport with the 
statutory scheme of states wi iich have foui id a val id marriage even 
if the statutory requirements are not met. See Gamez, 559 P.2d 
at 1099. 
The State also relies on two secondary sources and two 
older cases from other states in support of its argument that 
failure to return the license and certificate does not invalidate 
the marriage under Utah statutes. : at. ^ -26. These 
citations are not compelling since they do not involve an 
analysis of Utah's statutory provisions and involve very little 
analysis other than a determination that the controlling state 
statute does not require a return of the license. While some 
states do not require that all of the statutory requirements be 
met in order to have a valid marriage, other states consider the 
statutory requirements mandatory to a valid marriage. See, e.g., 
Gamez, 559 P=2d at 1099; United States v. White, 545 F.2d 1129, 
1130 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing Spicer v. Spicer, 397 , ..2d 129, 
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130 (Ark. I960)) (Arkansas does not recognize common law 
marriages and statutes regulating marriage are mandatory); 
Randall v. Randall, 345 N.W. 2d 319 (Neb. 1984) (failure to obtain 
a valid marriage license invalidates marriage); Moran v. Moran, 
933 P.2d 1207 (Ariz. 1996)(same); Roe v. Ludtke Trucking, Inc., 
732 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Wash. App. 1987) ("In Washington, marriage 
can be created only by compliance with statutory provisions"). 
In Gamez, the court discussed the impact of ceremonial 
defects on the validity of a marriage. Id. Quoting 47 A.L.R. 2d 
13 94, the court stated: 
§ 10. Ceremonial defect; proxy marriage. 
It is within the legislative power to 
regulate the matter of marriage and to require 
that a certain procedure be followed in entering 
into marriage [citation omitted], and in a number 
of jurisdictions the statutory procedural and 
formal requirements are regarded as mandatory, 
and accordingly common-law marriages are therein 
rendered invalid [citation omitted]. In most 
jurisdictions, however, it is held that statutory 
provisions dealing with formal solemnization and 
matters preliminary thereto are directory only 
and that a nonobservance thereof will not affect 
the validity of a ceremony as a common-law 
marriage [citation omitted]. 
Gamez, 559 P.2d at 1099 (emphasis added). The Gamez court then 
recognized that "Arizona falls in the first category, in that 
noncompliance with the statutory formalities renders the marriage 
invalid." Id. 
Additionally, the State claims that "the law evidences 
an intent to render all marriages legal from the time they are 
solemnized." S.B. at 26. The State is correct that this Court 
has noted that marriages begin on the date of solemnization. See 
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Walters, 812 P.2d at 67-68. Under Utah's statutory scheme, in 
the usual course of events, the parties apply for a license, a 
ceremony is held and the officiate then returns the required 
license and certificate. Dating marriages from the date of the 
ceremony does not conflict w:i th a mandatory requirement that the 
license and certificate be returned in the usual course of 
events. The completed application and certificate record the 
date of the ceremony and provide notice of that date. Dating 
marriages from the date of the ceremony serves the religious 
purpose for marriages since the importance of the ceremony is 
recognized; it provides a definite date foi the start: < • • 
marriage since parties would not know the exact date of return of 
the license and certificate. In cases where the license and 
certificate are returned, the determination that a legal marriage 
exists which began on the date of the ceremony serves the 
purposes for marriage and provides clear information to the 
participants and others as to the date on which a marriage 
begins. 
By contrast, in circumstances where the license and 
certificate are not returned, there is not a record of the date 
of the marriage. For example, in this case, although the 
application indicates that the marriage was planned for June 19, 
1993, the space where the officiate is to fill in the date of the 
marriage is blank. The officiate testified that the wedding was 
mid-summer 1993 (R. 154:90); Debbie Campbell assumed it was 
June 1 p 1993, the date of the application, rather than the 
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planned date of June 19, 1993. See R. 154:185; D.E. 14 (in 
Addendum D). Since a planned date does not mean an actual date, 
the application contains no information as to the actual date of 
the wedding. 
The State lists a possible parade of horribles which it 
thinks might occur if this Court were to require return of the 
license and certificate in order to validate a marriage. S.B. at 
27-28. First, the State claims that making the statutory 
requirements mandatory "would open the door for parties to 
solemnize their marriages, willfully retain the documents, and 
intentionally invalidate their own marriage for purposes of 
increasing public assistance benefits, while at the same time, 
reaping the cultural, moral and religious benefits of being 
married." S.B. at 27-28. This fear assumes that parties would 
know that being married would decrease their benefits; in such 
circumstances, it is unlikely that the parties would take the 
initial steps of applying for a license. In addition, for this 
scenario to occur, the officiate would have to be willing to 
commit a misdemeanor and fail to return the documents to the 
county clerk as mandated by statute. Furthermore, it is 
difficult to understand how parties who were cunning enough to 
create a sham marriage as outlined by the State, would reap any 
cultural, moral or religious benefits from pursuing such a sham 
while also defrauding the State. 
The State lists a number of additional concerns which it 
thinks might exist if return of the documents is mandatory. 
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First, because of the mandatory obligation to return the required 
documents within 3 0 days and the associated criminal penalties, 
in the vast majority of cases, these questions will not arise. 
Indeed, the dearth of case law in this area demonstrates in 
almost all cases, officiates return documentation in a timely 
fashion. In those few cases where documentation is not returned, 
the marriage can be validated pursuant to Section 30-1-4.5 if the 
parties have lived together as man and wife. 
A parade of possible horribles likewise exists if this 
Court were to determine that a valid marriage exists even if the 
certificate and license are not returned. Not all licenses are 
returned after an application for a license to marry is made. In 
circumstances where a ceremony is not held within the prescribed 
time or parties decide not to marry, no return is made. A party 
who researches whether an individual is married by reviewing 
applications at the county clerk's office would have no way of 
knowing whether a marriage which was solemnized occurred or 
whether the parties decided not to marry. Moreover, a party 
researching whether an individual was married who went to the 
department of vital statistics would find no record of a 
marriage. Hence, under Utah's statutory scheme, if the ceremony 
itself validates a marriage, no permanent record of that marriage 
would exist. The purposes of notice, recordation and collection 
of vital statistics would not be served. 
This issue involves a purely legal question which 
requires this Court to analyze Utah's marriage statutes and 
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determine whether an officiate must return the required documents 
in order for a marriage to be valid. A review of those statutes 
pursuant to the ordinary rules of statutory construction 
clarifies that the requirements are mandatory. The trial judge 
therefore correctly granted Giles' motion to arrest judgment on 
Count I. 
B. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, COUNT I IS REINSTATED, 
THE SHONDEL ARGUMENT APPLIES TO COUNT I AND 
REQUIRES ENTRY OF CONVICTION FOR A CLASS B 
MISDEMEANOR IF THAT COUNT IS REINSTATED. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court reverses the trial 
judge's dismissal of Count I, conviction should be entered for a 
class B misdemeanor pursuant to the analysis set forth in 
Shondel, 453 P.2d at 148, and its progeny. The Shondel argument 
applicable to Count II, as set forth in Point I of Appellant's 
opening and reply briefs, is equally applicable to Count I. The 
Information charged Count I as failure to disclose a material 
fact or change in circumstances. R. 01-02. Instruction #5 
likewise charged a general failure to disclose a material fact. 
R. 98; see Addendum E to A.B. The State introduced S.E. 6, an 
application for assistance and S.E. 7, a review form completed 
while receiving benefits in support of its claim that Giles 
committed welfare fraud by failing to disclose that she was 
married. R. 155:134, 136-37. Hence, the State relied on Giles' 
actions while she was a "recipient" to support its claim. 
Additionally, Giles received benefits in the month immediately 
prior to the month in which she filled out the application. See 
discussion supra at 3-7. Sections 76-8-1203(3) and 76-8-1205 
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contain the same elements. Because "the exact same conduct is 
subject to different penalties depending on which of two 
statutory sections a prosecutor chooses to charge" (see State v. 
Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 263 (Utah 1985)), Giles is entitled to the 
lesser class B misdemeanor penalty for Count I. 
C. ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, COUNT I IS REINSTATED, 
COUNTS I AND II SHOULD BE CONSOLIDATED. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court reverses the trial 
court's dismissal of Count I, Counts I and II should be 
consolidated into a single count since they involve the same 
facts and circumstances or a related series of facts and 
circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1206(2) (1995). As set 
forth more fully in A.B. at 30-35, the State relied on the same 
documents and actions to support both charges. Accordingly, 
Counts I and II should be consolidated into a single count. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Kathleen Giles respectfully requests that this 
Court dismiss her conviction for Count II and dismiss the charge 
based on insufficient evidence. In the event this Court 
concludes the evidence was sufficient for Count II, Appellant 
requests that Count II be remanded for resentencing as a class B 
misdemeanor. 
In regard to Count I, Appellant respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm the dismissal of that count. In the event 
that Count I is reinstated, Appellant requests that the two 
counts be consolidated into a single class B misdemeanor. 
25 
SUBMITTED this JTtt day of April, 1998. 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee 
ROBIN K. LJUNGBERG 
Attorney for Appellant/ 
Cross-Appellee 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 450 S. State, 5th Floor, P. O. Box 140230, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84114-023 0, and four copies to the Utah Attorney 
General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 E. 300 South, 
6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, 
this JZ7tt day of April, 1998. 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED copies to the Utah Court of Appeals and the 
Utah Attorney General's Office as indicated above this day 
of April, 1998. 
26 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
26-2-24. Marriage licenses — Execution and filing re-
quirements. 
The state registrar shall supply county clerks with applica-
tion forms for marriage licenses. Completed applications shall 
be transmitted by the clerks to the state registrar monthly. 
The personal identification information contained on each 
application for a marriage license filed with the county clerk 
shall be entered on a form supplied by the state registrar. The 
person performing the marriage shall furnish the date and 
place of marriage and his name and address. The form shall be 
completed and certified by the county clerk before it is filed 
with the state registrar. 1995 
30-1-1* Incestuous marr iages void. 
Marriages between parents and children, ancestors and 
descendants of every degree, brothers and sisters of the half as 
well as the whole blood, uncles and nieces, aunts and neph-
ews, first cousins, or between any persons related to each 
other within and not including the fifth degree of consanguin-
ity computed according to the rules of the civil law, are 
incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the relation-
ship is legitimate or illegitimate. 1953 
30-1-2. Marr iages prohibi ted and void. 
The following marriages are prohibited and declared void: 
(1) when there is a husband or wife living, from whom 
the person many ing has not been divorced; 
(2) when the male or female is under 18 years of age 
unless consent is obtained as provided in Section 30-1-9; 
(3) when the male or female is under 14 years of age; 
(4) between a divorced person and any person other 
than the one from whom the divorce was secured until the 
divorce decree becomes absolute, and, if an appeal is 
taken, until after the affirmance of the decree; 
(5) between persons of the same sex. 1993 (2nd as.) 
30-1-4.5. Validity of marriage not solemnized. 
(1) A marriage which is not solemnized according to this 
chapter shall be legal and valid if a court or administrative 
order establishes tha t it arises out of a contract between two 
consenting parties who: 
(a) are capable of giving consent; 
(b) are legally capable of entering a solemnized mar-
riage under the provisions of this chapter; 
(c) have cohabited; 
(d) mutually assume marital rights, duties, and obliga-
tions; and 
(e) who hold themselves out as and have acquired a 
uniform and general reputation as husband and wife. 
(2) The determination or establishment of a marriage un-
der this section must occur during the relationship described 
in Subsection (1), or within one year following the termination 
of tha t relationship. Evidence of a marriage recognizable 
under this section may be manifested in any form, and may be 
proved under the same general rules of evidence as facts in 
other cases. 1987 
30-1-5. Marriage solemnization — Before unautho-
rized person — Validity. 
No marriage solemnized before any person professing to 
have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such 
authority, if consummated in the belief of the parties or either 
of them that he had such authority and that they have been 
lawfully married. 1953 
30-1-6. Who may solemnize marriages — Certificate. 
(1) Marriages may be solemnized by the following persons 
only: 
(a) ministers, rabbis, or priests of any religious denomi-
nation in regular communion with any religious society, 
who are 18 years of age or older; 
(b) the governor, mayors of municipalities, a justice, 
judge, or commissioner of a court of record or a judge of a 
court not of record of the state of Utah; 
(c) judges or magistrates of the United States; and 
(d) the county clerk of any county in the state, if the 
clerk chooses to solemnize marriages. 
(2) A judge or magistrate who holds office in Utah may 
solemnize marriages when retired, under rules set by the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) A certificate of marriage shall be given to the couple and 
shall show the name of the county from which the license is 
issued and date of its issuance. 
(4) In this section, ^judge or magistrate of the United 
States" means a justice of the United States Supreme Court, a 
judge of a court of appeals, a district court, or any court 
created by an act of Congress the judges of which are entitled 
to hold office during good behavior, a judge of a bankruptcy 
court or a tax court, or a United States magistrate. 1998 
30-1-7. Marriage licenses. 
No marriage may be solemnized without a license issued by 
the county clerk of any county of the state of Utah not more 
than 30 days prior to the date of solemnization of the mar-
riage. 1987 
30-1-8. Application for license — Contents. 
(1) A marriage license may be issued by the county clerk 
only after an application has been filed in his office, requiring 
the following information: 
(a) the full names of the parties, including the maiden 
name of the female; 
(b) the Social Security numbers of the parties, unless 
the party has not been assigned a number; 
(c) the current address of each party; 
(d) the date and place of birth (town or city, county, 
state or country, if possible); 
(e) the names of their respective parents, including the 
maiden name of the mother; 
(f) the birthplaces of fathers and mothers (town or city, 
county, state or country, if possible); and 
(g) the distinctive race or nationality of each of the 
parents. 
(2) If the female is a widow, her maiden name shall be 
shown in brackets. 
(3) If one or both of the parties is under 16 years of age, the 
clerk shall provide them with a standard petition on a form 
approved by the Judicial Council to be presented to the 
juvenile court to obtain the authorization required by Section 
30-1-9. 
(4) (a) The Social Security numbers obtained under the 
authority of this section may not be recorded on the 
marriage license, and are not open to inspection as a part 
of the vital statistics files. 
(b) The Department of Health, Bureau of Vital Records 
and Health Statistics shall, upon request, supply those 
Social Security numbers to the Office of Recovery Services 
within the Department of Human Services. 
(c) The Office of Recovery Services may not use any 
Social Security numbers obtained under the authority of 
this section for any reason other than the administration 
of child support services. 1996 
30-1-11. Return of license after ceremony — Failure — 
Penalty. 
The person solemnizing the marriage shall within 30 days 
thereafter return the license to the clerk of the county whence 
it issued, with a certificate of the marriage over his signature-
giving the date and place of celebration and the names of twa 
or more witnesses present at the marriage. For failure ta 
make such return he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. last. 
30-1-12. Clerk to file license and certificate. 
(1) The license, together with the certificate of the person 
officiating at the marriage, shall be filed and preserved by the 
clerk, and shall be recorded by him in a book kept for that 
purpose, or by electronic means. The record shall be properly 
indexed in the names of the parties so married. 
(2) A transcript shall be promptly certified and transmitted 
by the clerk to the state registrar of vital statistics. ises 
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DEC94 
N0V94 
0CT94 
SEP94 
AUG94 
JUL94 
JUN94 
MAY94 
FEB94 
I 
AMOUNT 
426 
426 
426 
426 
426 
426 
426 
426 
414 
414 
414 
414 
213 
484 
SSUA] 
REASi 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
IN 
RE 
08NOV96 14:29 
ROBERT R 
CASE NUMBER: 00020469 
CASE STATUS: CLOSED DATE: 310CT96 
OCUMENT STATUS STATUS 
STATUS DATE REASON SPI 
BENEFIT MONTH: 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
01MAY95 
03APR95 
02MAR95 
02FEB95 
03JAN95 
02DEC94 
02NOV94 
03OCT94 
02SEP94 
02AUG94 
06JUL94 
02JUN94 
25MAY94 
03FEB94 
NEXT—> 
*~INFO * MORE PAGES EXIST 
FAIH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE ISSUANCE HISTORY 
CASE NAME: GILES, KATHLEEN J 
WAR CHK VENDOR MAIL 
NUMBER DATE 
08NOV96 14 
ROBERT R 
CASE NUMBER: 00020469 
CASE STATUS: CLOSED DATE: 310CT96 
PAYMENT ISSUANCE DOCUMENT STATUS STATUS 
MONTH AMOUNT REASON STATUS DATE REASON 
31408166 
31423642 
31399732 
31359985 
31335951 
31333569 
31333568 
31262275 
31237646 
31228724 
31187211 
31160115 
00151208 
31134852 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
30DEC93 
04JAN94 
02DEC93 
290CT93 
30SEP93 
15SEP93 
15SEP93 
30JUN93 
28MAY93 
04MAY93 
31MAR93 
26FEB93 
23MAR93 
29JAN93 
JAN94 
JAN94 
DEC93 
NOV93 
OCT93 
SEP93 
AUG93 
JUL93 
JUN93 
MAY93 
APR93 
MAR93 
MAR93 
FEB93 
164 
320 
164 
484 
484 
484 
31 
416 
198 
198 
470 
402 
21 
402 
RE 
SP 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
IN 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
SP 
RE 
BENEFIT MONTH: 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
04JAN94 
05JAN94 
07DEC93 
01NOV93 
04OCT93 
17SEP93 
17SEP93 
02JUL93 
01JUN93 
04MAY93 
02APR93 
01MAR93 
27MAR93 
02FEB93 
NEXT—> 
* INFO * MORE PAGES EXIST 
FAIH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE ISSUANCE HISTORY 
CASE NAME: GILES, KATHLEEN J 
08NOV96 14 
ROBERT R 
CASE NUMBER: 00020469 
CASE STATUS: CLOSED DATE: 310CT96 
WAR CHK 
NUMBER 
31110081 
31084245 
31058975 
31033900 
31009101 
30984727 
30960520 
30936283 
30911944 
30886881 
30861894 
30837493 
30813137 
30789221 
VENDOR 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
MAIL 
DATE 
31DEC92 
30NOV92 
30OCT92 
30SEP92 
31AUG92 
30JUL92 
30JUN92 
29MAY92 
30APR92 
31MAR92 
28FEB92 
31JAN92 
30DEC91 
29NOV91 
PAYMENT 
MONTH 
JAN93 
DEC92 
NOV92 
OCT92 
SEP92 
AUG92 
JUL92 
JUN92 
MAY92 
APR92 
MAR92 
FEB92 
JAN92 
DEC91 
AMOUNT 
402 
402 
402 
402 
402 
402 
402 
402 
402 
402 
402 
402 
402 
402 
ISSUANCE 
REASON 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
DOCUMENT 
STATUS 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
BENEFIT MONTH: 
STATUS STAT1 
DATE REAS< 
04JAN93 
02DEC92 
02NOV92 
02OCT92 
02SEP92 
03AUG92 
02JUL92 
01JUN92 
04MAY92 
03APR92 
03MAR92 
03FEB92 
03JAN92 
03DEC91 
NEXT—> 
* INFO * MORE PAGES EXIST 
FAIH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE ISSUANCE HISTORY 
CASE NAME: GILES, KATHLEEN J 
WAR CHK VENDOR MAIL 
NUMBER DATE 
08NOV96 14 
ROBERT R 
CASE NUMBER: 00020469 
CASE STATUS: CLOSED DATE: 310CT96 
PAYMENT ISSUANCE DOCUMENT STATUS STATUS 
MONTH AMOUNT REASON STATUS DATE REASON 
30765564 
30742478 
30719475 
30696808 
30674367 
30651364 
00832387 
30585526 
30563232 
30541614 
30519970 
30497870 
30476608 
30455454 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
30OCT91 
30SEP91 
30AUG91 
31JUL91 
28JUN91 
30MAY91 
16MAY91 
27FEB91 
30JAN91 
28DEC90 
30NOV90 
31OCT90 
28SEP90 
31AUG90 
NOV91 
OCT91 
SEP91 
AUG91 
JUL91 
JUN91 
MAY91 
MAR91 
FEB91 
JAN91 
DEC90 
NOV90 
OCT90 
SEP90 
402 
402 
402 
402 
402 
402 
337 
417 
417 
402 
402 
402 
402 
126 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
IN 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
BENEFIT MONTH: 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
04NOV91 
03OCT91 
04SEP91 
05AUG91 
02JUL91 
04JUN91 
21MAY91 
04MAR91 
05FEB91 
02JAN91 
04DEC90 
06NOV90 
02OCT90 
05SEP90 
NEXT—> 
*„INFO * MORE PAGES EXIST 
FAIH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE ISSUANCE HISTORY 
CASE NAME: GILES, KATHLEEN J 
WAR CHK VENDOR MAIL PAYMENT 
NUMBER DATE MONTH 
08NOV96 14 
ROBERT R 
CASE NUMBER: 00020469 
CASE STATUS: CLOSED DATE: 310CT96 
ISSUANCE DOCUMENT STATUS STATUS 
AMOUNT REASON STATUS DATE REASON 
30434420 
30425059 
30392603 
30371730 
30350643 
30329372 
30312143 
30291526 
30271146 
30250773 
30230492 
00738522 
30190074 
30170460 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
31JUL90 
03JUL90 
31MAY90 
30APR90 
30MAR90 
28FEB90 
31JAN90 
29DEC89 
30NOV89 
310CT89 
29SEP89 
01SEP89 
31JUL89 
30JUN89 
AUG90 
JUL90 
JUN90 
MAY90 
APR90 
MAR90 
FEB90 
JAN90 
DEC89 
NOV89 
OCT89 
SEP89 
AUG89 
JUL89 
146 
3 
324 
387 
387 
387 
387 
387 
387 
387 
387 
387 
387 
387 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
BENEFIT MONTH: 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
03AUG90 
10JUL90 
05JUN90 
04MAY90 
03APR90 
06MAR90 
06FEB90 
04JAN90 
06DEC89 
03NOV89 
04OCT89 
08SEP89 
04AUG89 
06JUL89 
NEXT—> 
*~ INFO * END OF DISPLAY REACHED 
FAIH FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE ISSUANCE HISTORY 
CASE NAME: GILES, KATHLEEN J 
WAR CHK VENDOR MAIL 
NUMBER DATE 
08NOV96 14 
ROBERT R 
CASE NUMBER: 00020469 
CASE STATUS: CLOSED DATE: 310CT96 
PAYMENT ISSUANCE DOCUMENT STATUS STATUS 
MONTH AMOUNT REASON STATUS DATE REASON 
30149923 
30130083 
30108977 
30087833 
30068003 
30048379 
30034600 
30023618 
30013894 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
30MAY89 
01MAY89 
29MAR89 
24FEB89 
30JAN89 
30DEC88 
29NOV88 
270CT88 
28SEP88 
JUN89 
MAY89 
APR89 
MAR89 
FEB89 
JAN89 
DEC88 
NOV88 
OCT88 
376 
376 
376 
376 
376 
376 
376 
376 
376 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
RD 
05JUN89 
02MAY89 
05APR89 
03MAR89 
06FEB89 
06JAN89 
07DEC88 
05NOV88 
06OCT88 
RM 
BENEFIT MONTH: NEXT—> 
* INtf'O * MORE PAGES EXIST 
FSIH FOOD STAMP ISSUANCE HISTORY 08NOV96 14:28 
ROBERT R 
CASE NAME.: GILES, KATHLEEN J CASE NUMBER: 00020469 
CASE STATUS: CLOSED DATE: 310CT96 
AUTH WARR REPL MAIL BENEFIT ISS DEL CERT DOC STAT STAT CSH 
NUMBER NUMBER DATE MONTH AMOUNT REA MTD NUMBER STA DATE REAS OUT SPI 
351 
294 
401 
412 
386 
329 
57 
329 
286 
286 
286 
311 
312 
312 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RS 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
E 
P 
P 
P 
P 
EB 
EB 
EB 
EB 
EB 
EB 
EB 
EB 
EB 
EB 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
02OCT96 
30AUG96 
31JUL96 
28JUN96 
30MAY96 
30APR96 
15MAY96 
04APR96 
27FEB96 
26JAN96 
22DEC95 
24N0V95 
260CT95 
27SEP95 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
Y 
BENEFIT MONTH: NEXT—> 
50280456 
50246305 
50218784 
50179252 
50141529 
50104974 
50137921 
50079933 
50039730 
50021673 
63559941 
63519733 
63484819 
63456022 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
05OCT96 
05SEP96 
05AUG96 
05JUL96 
05JUN96 
05MAY96 
16MAY96 
05APR96 
05MAR96 
05FEB96 
05JAN96 
05DEC95 
03NOV95 
050CT95 
OCT96 
SEP96 
AUG96 
JUL96 
JUN96 
MAY96 
MAY96 
APR96 
MAR96 
FEB96 
JAN96 
DEC95 
NOV95 
OCT95 
* INFO * MORE PAGES EXIST 
FSIH FOOD STAMP ISSUANCE HISTORY 08NOV96 14:28 
' ROBERT R 
CASE NAME: GILES, KATHLEEN J CASE NUMBER: 00020469 
CASE STATUS: CLOSED DATE: 310CT96 
AUTH WARR REPL MAIL BENEFIT ISS DEL CERT DOC STAT STAT CSH 
NUMBER NUMBER DATE MONTH AMOUNT REA MTD NUMBER STA DATE RE AS OUT SPI 
300 
300 
83 
83 
153 
153 
153 
91 
60 
60 
60 
57 
57 
47 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
SP 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
P 
D 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
25AUG95 
03AUG95 
27JUN95 
25MAY95 
25APR95 
24MAR95 
23FEB95 
23FEB95 
26JAN95 
23DEC94 
23N0V94 
260CT94 
27SEP94 
26AUG94 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
BENEFIT MONTH: NEXT—> 
63417032 
63389044 
63326643 
63292491 
63250916 
63200179 
63160273 
63155169 
63114412 
63074022 
63035522 
62982827 
62938830 
62899519 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
05SEP95 
03AUG95 
05JUL95 
05JUN95 
05MAY95 
05APR95 
03MAR95 
24FEB95 
03FEB95 
05JAN95 
05DEC94 
04NOV94 
05OCT94 
02SEP94 
SEP95 
AUG95 
JUL95 
JUN95 
MAY95 
APR95 
MAR95 
FEB95 
FEB95 
JAN95 
DEC94 
N0V94 
0CT94 
SEP94 
* INFO * MORE PAGES EXIST 
FSIH FOOD STAMP ISSUANCE HISTORY 08NOV96 14:28 
ROBERT R 
CASE NAME: GILES, KATHLEEN J CASE NUMBER: 00020469 
CASE STATUS: CLOSED DATE: 310CT96 
AUTH WARR REPL MAIL BENEFIT ISS DEL CERT DOC STAT STAT CSH 
NUMBER NUMBER DATE MONTH AMOUNT REA MTD NUMBER STA DATE REAS OUT SPI 
92 
92 
92 
94 
331 
303 
72 
303 
331 
331 
370 
23 
299 
300 
RE 
RE 
RE 
IN 
RE 
RE 
RS 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
EX 
RE 
RE 
P 
P 
P 
D 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
P 
D 
D 
P 
P 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
22JUL94 
24JUN94 
25MAY94 
20MAY94 
26JAN94 
23DEC93 
27DEC93 
26N0V93 
260CT93 
24SEP93 
01SEP93 
01SEP93 
25JUN93 
25MAY93 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
BENEFIT MONTH: NEXT—> 
62849430 
62808791 
62759727 
62758389 
62579233 
62533256 
62544274 
62498885 
62439904 
62404524 
62361458 
62361457 
62258188 
62208844 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
05AUG94 
05JUL94 
03JUN94 
20MAY94 
04FEB94 
05JAN94 
28DEC93 
29N0V93 
05NOV93 
05OCT93 
01SEP93 
01SEP93 
02JUL93 
04JUN93 
AUG94 
JUL94 
JUN94 
MAY94 
FEB94 
JAN94 
JAN94 
DEC93 
N0V93 
0CT93 
SEP93 
AUG93 
JUL93 
JUN93 
* INFO * MORE PAGES EXIST 
FSIH FOOD STAMP ISSUANCE HISTORY 08NOV96 14:28 
ROBERT R 
CASE NAME: GILES, KATHLEEN J CASE NUMBER: 00020469 
CASE STATUS: CLOSED DATE: 310CT96 
AUTH WARR REPL MAIL BENEFIT ISS DEL CERT DOC STAT STAT CSH 
NUMBER NUMBER DATE MONTH AMOUNT REA MTD NUMBER STA DATE REAS OUT SPI 
316 
292 
292 
295 
383 
370 
342 
350 
361 
388 
277 
130 
277 
242 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RS 
EX 
RE 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
C 
c 
c 
c 
c 
D 
D 
C 
489937 
465892 
444472 
484048 
462938 
440647 
483089 
462716 
441682 
485114 
463047 
482934 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
26FEB92 
29JAN92 
26DEC91 
26NOV91 
290CT91 
26SEP91 
27AUG91 
29JUL91 
26JUN91 
28MAY91 
26APR91 
16MAY91 
03APR91 
25FEB91 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
BENEFIT MONTH: NEXT—> 
61524757 
61480314 
61437050 
61383734 
61341315 
61298538 
61256497 
61223611 
61173480 
61133445 
61093299 
61128848 
61073545 
61011453 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
05MAR92 
05FEB92 
27DEC91 
05DEC91 
05NOV91 
04OCT91 
05SEP91 
30JUL91 
05JUL91 
05JUN91 
03MAY91 
16MAY91 
03APR91 
05MAR91 
MAR92 
FEB92 
JAN92 
DEC91 
NOV91 
OCT91 
SEP91 
AUG91 
JUL91 
JUN91 
MAY91 
MAY91 
APR91 
MAR91 
* INFO * MORE PAGES EXIST 
PSIH FOOD STAMP ISSUANCE HISTORY 08NOV96 14: 
ROBERT R 
CASE NAME: GILES, KATHLEEN J CASE NUMBER: 00020469 
CASE STATUS: CLOSED DATE: 310CT96 
AUTH WARR REPL MAIL BENEFIT ISS DEL CERT DOC STAT STAT CSH 
NUMBER NUMBER DATE MONTH AMOUNT REA MTD NUMBER STA DATE REAS OUT 
242 
247 
247 
247 
219 
191 
158 
133 
184 
206 
230 
230 
230 
230 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
C 
C 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
462046 
442417 
486258 
466782 
447131 
493686 
475661 
462740 
442504 
489775 
472741 
454807 
438106 
485403 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
28JAN91 
27DEC90 
28NOV90 
260CT90 
26SEP90 
29AUG90 
27JUL90 
29JUN90 
25MAY90 
26APR90 
28MAR90 
23FEB90 
26JAN90 
27DEC89 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
BENEFIT MONTH: NEXT—> 
60971673 
60932878 
60894087 
60856099 
60818572 
60782319 
60745528 
60717497 
60672273 
60635912 
60599325 
60561484 
60526006 
60490590 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
05FEB91 
04JAN91 
05DEC90 
05NOV90 
05OCT90 
05SEP90 
03AUG90 
02JUL90 
05JUN90 
04MAY90 
05APR90 
05MAR90 
05FEB90 
05JAN90 
FEB91 
JAN91 
DEC90 
NOV90 
OCT90 
SEP90 
AUG90 
JUL90 
JUN90 
MAY90 
APR90 
MAR90 
FEB90 
JAN90 
* INFO * MORE PAGES EXIST 
FSIH FOOD STAMP ISSUANCE HISTORY 08NOV96 14:28 
ROBERT R 
CASE NAME: GILES, KATHLEEN J CASE NUMBER: 00020469 
CASE STATUS: CLOSED DATE: 310CT96 
AUTH WARR REPL MAIL BENEFIT ISS DEL CERT DOC STAT STAT CSH 
NUMBER NUMBER DATE MONTH AMOUNT REA MTD NUMBER STA DATE REAS OUT SPI 
230 
212 
212 
185 
185 
185 
206 
270 
270 
270 
270 
270 
270 
270 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
RE 
C 
c 
c 
D 
C 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
c 
468847 
451929 
499426 
468465 
453121 
437561 
486348 
464574 
447772 
492063 
471368 
458530 
451258 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
IS 
28NOV89 
270CT89 
27SEP89 
01SEP89 
27JUL89 
28JUN89 
25MAY89 
26APR89 
2 4 MAR 8 9 
21FEB89 
25JAN89 
27DEC88 
23NOV88 
240CT88 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
N 
BENEFIT MONTH: NEXT—> 
60456226 
60422077 
60388032 
60362317 
60320076 
60293398 
60254249 
60218659 
60182678 
60147490 
60110764 
60084606 
60059693 
60041185 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
00000000 
05DEC89 
03NOV89 
05OCT89 
01SEP89 
04AUG89 
05JUL89 
05JUN89 
05MAY89 
05APR89 
03MAR89 
03FEB89 
05JAN89 
05DEC88 
04NOV88 
DEC89 
NOV89 
OCT89 
SEP89 
AUG89 
JUL89 
JUN89 
MAY89 
APR89 
MAR89 
FEB89 
JAN89 
DEC88 
NOV88 
* INFO * END OP DISPLAY REACHED 
FSIH FOOD STAMP ISSUANCE HISTORY 08NOV96 14:28 
ROBERT R 
CASE NAME: GILES, KATHLEEN J CASE NUMBER: 00020469 
CASE STATUS: CLOSED DATE: 310CT96 
AUTH WARR REPL MAIL BENEFIT ISS DEL CERT DOC STAT STAT CSH 
NUMBER NUMBER DATE MONTH AMOUNT REA MTD NUMBER STA DATE REAS OUT SPI 
60025853 00000000 05OCT88 OCT88 270 RE C 444678 IS 23SEP88 N 
BENEFIT MONTH: NEXT—> 
ADDENDUM C 
MARRIAGE 
LICENSE 
5759 
STATE OF UTAH — DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 
APPLICATION FOR LICENSE TO MARRY 
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ADDENDUM D 
CAAU CASE «CTION UPDATE/DISPLAY 16APR96 10:36 
(DISPLAY) ROBERT R 
CASE NAME: GILES, KATHLEEN J 
CASE NUMBER: 00020469 REGION: C C WORKER: DEBBIE J CAMPBELL, 
PAGE 1 OF 1 CREATION DATE: 13JUL95 
CLIENT SUBMITTED A COPY OF TEMP RESTRAINING ORDER AND TEMP CUSTODY PAPERS 
FOR THE CHILDREN THAT SHE AND PAUL FELECETTI HAVE IN COMMON. CLIENT 
ALSO SUBMITTED A DOCUMENT WHICH IS A MARRIAGE LICENSE REQUEST FORM AND 
SHE TOLD THE PERSON AT THE COUNTER THAT SHE DIDN'T THINK HER MARRIAGE 
WAS OFFICIAL BECAUSE OF SOME REASON. BUT I THINK IT IS, DID A 601 TO 
ORS, BECAUSE IF CLIENT WAS MARRIED ON 6/18/93 TO PAUL THEN SHE HAS ALOT 
OF OP'S BECAUSE SHE WAS ON AFDC THAT ENTIRE TIME. 
ACTION CODE: NEXT RECORDER NEXT—> 
